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Throughout 2018, Tunisia has been witness to a pro-
cess of disaffection towards its institutions and po-
litical class, revealing the limits of the consensus the 
country’s political life has revolved around in recent 
years. 
Although the Constitution provides for a semi-presi-
dentialist political system, the consensual dynamic 
generated between Nidaa Tounes and Ennahda after 
the 2014 legislative elections has allowed Beji Caid 
Essebsi to strengthen the role of the President of the 
Republic (Gobe, 2017). Elected by universal suf-
frage, and therefore with the personal legitimacy that 
the ballot box provides, he pushed for the formation of 
coalition governments of national unity, but without 
strong political leadership. The efforts of successive 
heads of government to achieve a more autonomous 
role have been a source of friction throughout his 
mandate. Thus, the dismissal of Habib Essid, a tech-
nocrat that led the government between 2015 and 
2016, did nothing to stop these tensions continuing 
with his successor at the head of the National Unity 
Government, Youssef Chahed (Gobe, 2018). These 
strains, together with the worsening economic situa-
tion and the absence of responses to the regional im-
balances and inequalities at the heart of the 2011 rev-
olution, have contributed to widening the rift between 
the population and the political elite, a situation re-
flected in the survey conducted by Afrobarometer in 
2018, according to which 81% of Tunisians did not 
identify with any political party (Afrobarometer, 2018).
The Limits of an Asymmetric Cohabitation
The government alliance between Nidaa Tounes and 
Ennahda was set up following the 2014 legislative 
elections, in a hostile regional context for Islamist 
movements after Morsi’s ousting in Egypt. It allevi-
ated the climate of identity polarization between Is-
lamists and modernists, which almost derailed the 
transition process in 2013. In 2016, the Carthage 
Agreement extended this alliance to other political 
and social actors and opened the door to the forma-
tion of a national unity government, tasked with run-
ning an agreed-upon programme aimed at bolster-
ing the economy, government efficiency and the fight 
against terrorism. 
Ennahda opted for a self-limiting strategy, accepting 
its diminished influence in the successive Nidaa 
Tounes-led governments, despite the comparatively 
high number of lawmakers it had in the Parliament. 
Notwithstanding this asymmetric cohabitation, how-
ever, mutual distrust remains between the two par-
ties, which, in turn, has slowed down the adoption of 
economic and social reforms, as well as prevented 
consensus on key issues related to the drafting of 
the Constitution in 2014. Five years after it was pro-
nounced, the Constitutional Court is yet to be creat-
ed, due to the failure of the Assembly of the Repre-
sentatives of the People (ARP) to elect its designated 
four members. This distrust also delayed approval of 
the Local Authorities Law until April 2018, passed 
just 10 days before the first local elections following 
the fall of Ben Ali. This delay and the law’s subse-
quent regulatory development reflect the central gov-
ernment’s reluctance to develop the principles of pos-
itive discrimination in favour of the less developed 
regions, as enshrined in the Constitution. The man-
agement of Tunisia’s regions continues to be overseen 













































ary between democratically elected town councils 
and the central State, with no date set by the gov-
ernment for holding regional elections (Yerkes and 
Ben Yahmed, 2019). The distrust between both par-
ties has also affected the functioning of the inde-
pendent bodies created by the Constitution, such as 
the Instance Supérieure Indépendante pour les Élec-
tions (ISIE), tasked with organizing elections. Fol-
lowing the resignation of its president Mohamed Tlili 
Mansri, after the local elections, the Parliament took 
seven months to appoint a successor. Nabil Baffoun 
was elected president of the body in January 2019, 
with just 9 months remaining before the legislative 
and presidential elections set for the autumn. 
2018 Tunisian Local Elections 
Having been postponed on several occasions, one 
of 2018’s milestones was the country’s first local 
elections since the revolution, a first step in the trans-
formation of a state with a long centralist tradition. 
The election of new town councils enabled the re-
placement of the “special delegations,” which had pro-
visionally managed local affairs since 2011, with dem-
ocratically elected local bodies.
The election law reform allowed members of the 
army and security forces to exercise their right to vote 
for the first time. Voting for women was encouraged 
through new measures. In addition to vertical parity, 
horizontal parity was ensured through a requirement 
for half the lists presented by political parties across 
the nation to be headed by women. These measures 
contributed to the fact that 47.5% of councillors were 
women. The presence of women in municipal govern-
ment institutions was also fostered by the Local Au-
thorities Law, which established that the positions of 
mayor and deputy mayor in local councils had to be 
occupied by a man and a woman respectively. The 
electoral law also established positive discrimination 
measures in favour of young people, requiring at least 
one out of the three first candidates of each list to be 
under 35 years old. In addition, the next six candidates 
also had to include at least one in the same age brack-
et. The participation of young people in local govern-
ment has also been facilitated by the requirement that 
the mayor or their deputy be under 35 years old. 
However, the introduction of these positive discrimi-
nation measures in favour of women and young peo-
ple did nothing to boost turnout at the ballot boxes, 
with the number of voters standing at 1,909,742, 
way below the turnout for the 2014 legislative elec-
tions, in which 3,579,257 citizens participated. The 
official participation rate, calculated based on the 
number of registered voters, was 35.7%; a figure 
that falls to 23.5% if calculations take into account 
the number of potential voters (Hernando de Larra-
mendi and Govantes).
Voting for women was encouraged 
through new measures. 
These measures contributed to 
the fact that 47.5% of councillors 
were women
The deteriorating image of political parties, together 
with the weak base of many of them, was reflected in 
their struggle to present candidates for the country’s 
350 local councils. Only Ennahda was able to run in 
all of them, closely followed by Nidaa Tounes (345). 
The third biggest political party in terms of candida-
cies presented was the Front Populaire (132). An-
other indicator of the disaffection towards political 
parties was the high number of independent lists 
that ran in the elections and the support they re-
ceived. The 860 independent lists together received 
32.3% of the votes nationwide, - surpassing all other 
parties in number of votes.
The election results show how support has dimin-
ished for the country’s main political parties. Al-
though Ennahda obtained 28.6% of the votes, it lost 
430,000 voters with respect to the 2014 legislative 
elections. The party has held onto its hegemony in 
the country’s south, with strong penetration in areas 
which, in 2014, had been won by Nidaa Tounes. 
Thanks to the support of many councillors from inde-
pendent lists, the party led by Rachid Ghannouchi 
was able to take 36% of town councils, including the 
country’s two biggest cities, Sfax and Tunis (ICG, 
2019). Souad Abderrahim, who had already been an 
MP in 2011 in the National Constituent Assembly, 
thereby took the job of heading the country’s capital. 
Nidaa Tounes, for its part, was severely punished by 













































Ennahda and the infighting over the party’s leader-
ship. It obtained 20.9% of the vote, but lost 800,000 
votes with respect to the 2014 legislative elections, 
with historic defeats in constituencies in Greater Tu-
nis, such as Ariana or Ben Arous. 
The Breaking of Consensus and the 
Reconfiguration of Alliances
The local election results highlighted the infighting 
within Nidaa Tounes, destabilized the national unity 
government and brought about a reconfiguration of 
alliances with a view to the legislative and presiden-
tial elections scheduled for 2019.
The widening rift between Nidaa Tounes and Ennah-
da, a prelude to the breaking of consensus between 
the two parties, could be seen in the process of draft-
ing a new Carthage Agreement. Pushed forward by 
President Essebsi to address the political and eco-
nomic crisis the country was still immersed in, the 
signing of the Carthage Agreement II was blocked by 
Ennahda’s refusal to support Youssef Chahed’s dis-
missal; a demand made by the President of the Re-
public with the backing of the country’s biggest trade 
union, the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), 
which opposed his programme of economic reforms. 
Support from Ennahda and the National Coalition 
Bloc, a parliamentary group led by defectors from 
Nidaa Tounes, has enabled Youssef Chahed to re-
main at the head of the cabinet and drive forward the 
creation of a new political party, Tahya Tounes.
The breakdown in consensus was made official in 
September 2018, when President Essebsi publicly 
announced the end of relations between Ennahda 
and the presidency in a television interview. The an-
nouncement of the split was preceded by the Presi-
dent’s efforts to highlight the differences between 
his party and that led by Rached Ghannouchi in mat-
ters of identity linked with the role of religion in public 
life. In accordance with recommendations proposed 
by the Committee for Individual Liberties and Equal-
ity (COLIBE), created in 2017 at the President’s re-
quest, Essebsi announced his support, in August 
2018, for a law that would ensure equal inheritance 
rights for men and women, a proposal that was re-
jected by Ennahda’s Shura Council. 
Ennahda’s support was also decisive in November 
for Youssef Chahed to go ahead with a partial cabi-
net reshuffle. Although it did not affect key portfolios, 
such as the defence and foreign affairs ministries, the 
changes were openly criticized by the President of 
the Republic, who said they were organized without 
prior consultation. The replacement of 13 ministers 
and five state secretaries did not change the balance 
of power within the government, in which Nidaa 
Tounes, even after having boycotted its ratification in 
the Parliament, has maintained a higher number of 
ministries (12) than Ennahda (8), despite the latter 
still having a greater number of lawmakers in the Par-
liament. The government has incorporated independ-
ents like Rene Trabelsi, the third Jewish minister since 
independence, prominent figures from the Ben Ali re-
gime like Kamel Morjane, the leader of al-Moubadara, 
and members of Machrouu Tounes, the party creat-
ed in 2016 as a breakaway from Nidaa Tounes. This 
reshuffle gave rise to a divided government with little 
chance of tackling the country’s many challenges, in 
a political context focused instead on the upcoming 
2019 legislative and presidential elections. 
The breaking of consensus could 
be seen in the process of drafting 
a new Carthage Agreement. Pushed 
forward to address the political and 
economic crisis the country was still 
immersed in
The Social Issue: An Endless Wire 
The aim of strengthening the political stability which 
has upheld consensus between the main political 
parties has failed to improve the economic situa-
tion or achieve greater social stability. The lack of 
response to the socioeconomic demands that trig-
gered the 2011 revolution continues to fuel regular 
protests in the country against the government’s 
economic policy and the marginalization of less de-
veloped regions suffering from persistent inequalities 
and high unemployment rates (Hernando de Larra-
mendi and Thieux, 2018).
The erosion of people’s trust in the political system, 
which is especially important among the youth, is 













































out the country. According to data from the Forum 
Tunisien pour les Droits Économiques et Sociaux 
(FTDES), there were 9,356 protests in 2018. Most 
of these social movements took place in the gover-
norates of Kairouan (1668), Sidi Bouzid (881), Gaf-
sa (791), Tunis (749) and Kasserine (667) (FTDES, 
2018). Eight years after the revolution, the same re-
gions continue to be the victims of economic inequal-
ity, social exclusion and deficient public services. 
(Ben Romdhane, 2018). 
Another major source of social tension has been the 
implementation of reforms demanded by the IMF for 
the gradual disbursement of the 2.9-billion-dollar 
loan agreed in 2016 to revitalize the country’s econ-
omy. The austerity measures included in the Finance 
Act sparked major protests throughout the country 
in January 2018. The UGTT leads the rejection of the 
privatization programme, tax hikes and salary reduc-
tions for public workers, as instruments to reduce 
the fiscal deficit. The union, a signatory of the Carthage 
Agreement, opposed Chahed continuing at the head 
of the national unity government, accusing him of re-
nouncing “national sovereignty” under pressure from 
international lenders. The clashes between the union 
and the government have given rise to sectoral strikes 
in the education sector and two national strikes, in 
November 2018 and January 2019, supported most-
ly by civil servants - which account for around 6% of 
the country’s total population. 
The erosion of people’s trust in the 
political system, which is especially 
important among the youth, is 
reflected in the number of protests 
staged throughout the country
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